A reform proposal for Korean pension system by Phang, Hanam S. & Shin, Kee-Chul
A Reform Proposal for Korean Pension System
: Coordinated Development of the Public-
Private Pensions
OECD/INPRS/KOREA Conference on Private Pensions in Asia
October 24-25, Seoul, Korea
Hanam S. Phang (Korea Labor Institute, Korea)
Kee-Chul Shin (Financial Supervisory Service,
Korea)
2I. Korean Public Pension System: Recent Reform Efforts and Results
1. National Pension Reform Board (1988) and Its Reform Proposal
In less than 10 years since the introduction of the national pension system in 1988, the
National Pension Reform Board(NPRB) was convened to deal with the then-emerging
but inherent issues mainly relating to the sustainability of the current national pension
scheme(NPS) system. In particular, the board was commissioned to address such issues
as long-term financial sustainability, potential problems associated with the then-
planned extension of the coverage (to the urban self-employment sector), efficient
management of the fast growing reserve fund, lack of linkages within the public pension
schemes(i.e., between the NPS and Special Occupational Pension Schemes (for civil
servants, private school teachers, military personnel) and recommend appropriate
reform measures.
After more than a year’s activity, the NPRB produced a detailed report that included
three proposals for the reform of public pension system that the Government would
have to review. The three proposals commonly recognized the imminent problem with
the system’s financial sustainability, which is mainly due to ‘the overly generous
Government promises’1, as reflected in its benefit formula, over the initially mandated
contribution rates. But they differed substantially in the depth and extent of the reform
measures recommended.
- The first proposal advocated a parametric rather than system reform: scaling down
of the existing benefit formula and a scheduled increase of contribution rates;
- The second proposal advocated a systemic reform: splitting the scheme into a basic
pension and an earnings-related pension, in addition to downward adjustment of the
programmed benefit level;
- The third proposal advocated a Chillean pension system in place of the current
one: individual account-based Defined Contribution system.
The final recommendation of the majority advocated the second proposal. The core
content of the 2nd proposal is as follows:
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3 Current Korean Pension System, 2002
Personal Pension Personal Pension: Tax-treated (since 1994): E.E.T
- still poorly developed market
Retirement
Allowance Scheme
Mandatory(since
1961) for firms with
>=5 workers;
Minimum 1
month salary per 1
year service (=8.3%)
National Pension
System
National Pension Scheme (1988): partial
funding DB system; Mandatory
Pension Benefit = Contribution-based,
differentiated by income class
(redistributive portion + earnings-related
portion), starting at age 60
Contribution
Rate=9.0%(4.5%=employer, 4.5% on
employee)(6% for the Self-employed)
T.R.R. =60%(for 40 years contribution,
average wage worker)
Occupational
Corporate Pension
(1960 for G.E., 1975
for P. T)
Contribution Rate
= 17% (8.5% =
employee, 8.5% =
Government /
Corporate)
Target R.R. =
76% (for 33 year
maximum
contribution)
Pillar
        Group
Employed Workers Self-Employed
(including farmers)
Government
Employees
(+Military)/
Teachers
4 Proposed Changes to the Structure of the NPS
- Split the scheme into a basic pension and an earnings related pension, so that ‘1
pension per 1 person’ and ‘1 (earnings-related) pension per 1 contributor’ could be
settled. The basic pension should be an old-age income safety-net scheme with
universal coverage, financed by general budget or social security tax. The earnings-
related pension should be a fully-funded defined benefit-type pension completely based
on individual contribution.
 Proposed Adjustment to Pension Benefit and Contribution Rates
- Along with the splitting of the system into two parts, pension benefit level should be
adjusted. The target replacement level for the average wage worker with full
contribution history(40 years) is to be reduced from 70% to 40% to keep the public
pension system financially sound and viable, while preventing any excess increase in
the required contribution rate.2
- Of the 40% of the total replacement rate, the basic pension will cover about 16%, the
earnings-related portion will cover the rest(i.e., about 24%). The basic pension benefit
was recommended to be differentiated according to the income level, providing higher
replacement rate for the low-income class(ex, 53% for the 1st quintile, 7.1% for the fifth
quintile).
- The contribution level is to be maintained at current level(i.e., total 9%) until 2010 and
would be eventually raised to about 13% by 2025 for the financial stability to be
maintained.
 Proposed Interim Procedures for Reform
- For the extant participants, old scheme will be applied for the membership period until
reform and new scheme will be applied thereafter.
- The cumulated funds are to be proportionally allocated to the basic pension and to the
earnings-related pension by ratio (4:3)
The NPRB recommendations were not accepted. Instead, after public hearings, the
Ministry of Health and Welfare submitted, on May, 1998, a new reform proposal, which
resembled the much conservative minority view. The amended National Pension Act
reflects following measures:3
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5 Current unified benefit formula (redistribution + earnings-related portion) to be kept
 An increase in the retirement age from 60 to 61 in 2013 and then scheduled 1 year
increase ever five years thereafter up to 65 in 2033.
 A new benefit formula which would generate a 55% replacement rate for an average
wage worker for 40 years’ contribution
 A scheduled increase in the contribution rate to 16.25 by the year 2025
 Past years of participation would be credited under the old formula
 The extension of coverage of the National Pension to the urban self-employed in
October, 1998
 The supervision and management of the pension reserves to be handed over to the
Ministry of Health and Welfare from the Ministry of Finance and Economy
 Elimination of the lump-sum refund of the pension benefit accrued4
Most of the measures recommended by the Ministry of Health and Welfare were
reflected in the new National Pension Act amended in December, 1998. But the
National Congress, out of the well-known political populism, made several important
changes that further thwarted the original reform proposals: that is, (a)the target
replacement rate for an average worker was raised from 55 to 60%, (b)the gradual
increase in the contribution rate was not legislated, although five-year actuarial reviews
of the pension fund were mandated.
Minor amendments that made their ways into the revised Act include: (a) minimum
contribution period for pension benefit right reduced from 15 to 10years; (b)according
partial pension right to the spouse when the couple get divorced after living together
more than 5 years; (c) special provision introduced for those who could not participate
due to childcare, military service, institutionalization, etc to join the NPS later by
paying their deferred contributions.
2. The First Reformed National Pension Scheme
The NPS was legislated and mandated in 1988 to be applicable to Korean residents
aged 18-60. When first introduced its effective coverage was limited to employed
workers at firms with more than 10 employees. Thereafter the coverage was extended to
firms employing less than 10 workers (i.e., 5-9 workers in 1992). In 1995, the coverage
was further extended to include farmers and fishermen as well as the self-employed in
rural areas. In 1999, the self-employed in urban areas as well as workers at small (less
than five employees) workplaces are included to the system, thereby establishing a
nominally ‘universal’ coverage.
 The Coverage
As of the end of the year 2000, a total of 16,278,000 persons, including 5,680,000
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6employed workers and 10,889,000 self-employed participants, are covered by the
National Pension Scheme. Out of the 10,889,000 self-employed, only about 55%
declared and reported their income and made required contributions and the remaining
45% were exempt from contributions.5 As a result, the number of persons effectively
made contributions was only 11,643,000 (less than 70%).
Table 1-1 Number the National Pension Participants (2001)
                                                    (Unit: 1000 persons)
Self-Employed
Total EmployedWorkers
Total
Participants:
Income
Reported
Participants
Exempt from
Contribution
Voluntary
Participants
16,278 5,680 10,889 5,963 4,926 114
Source: National Pension Corporation Report (2001)
As of 2001, the number of National Pension beneficiaries is 607,000, 76.6% of whom
received Old-age Pension benefits and the rest received survivor’s pension or disability
pension. Since the implementation of National Pension Scheme, a total of 7,261,000
persons have received a lump sum refund.
Table 1-2 Number of National Pension Beneficiaries (November 2000)
                                                     (Unit: 1000 persons)
Total Old Age Pension Disability Pension Survivors’ Pension
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7607 465 25 117
Source: National Pension Corporation Report (2001)
 The Pension Benefit Level Targeted
The benefit formula of the NPS has two parts: redistributive part(A) and earnings-
related part(B). Given the required contribution rate based on workers’ payroll or the
declared income of the self-employed, the former redistributes pension income among
income-level classes and the latter reflects the participant’s earnings (contribution)
history. Pension benefit is indexed to consumer price and special tax concessions are
also provided. The ‘revised’ benefit formula of the NPS is as follows:
 Basic Pension (monthly) = 0.15 (A+B) (1+0.05*N)
A: the reevaluated (price-indexed) average monthly income for the last 3 years prior
to befit entitlement begins
B: the reevaluated average monthly income of the participant during the whole
contribution period
N: (≥1) = (years of contribution − 20 years)
Shown below is the target replacement rate according to the reformed NPS, which
varies with contribution history and income class
<Table 1-3> Target Replacement Rate by Contribution History and Income Class
                                                      (Unit: %)
Contribution Period
---------------------
Income Class
20 years 30 years 40 years
0.25A 0.750 1.000 1.000
0.5A 0.450 0.675 0.900
1.0A (Average) 0.300 0.450 0.600
2.0A 0.225 0.338 0.450
3.0A 0.200 0.300 0.400
Note: Replacement rate = (BPA/Lifetime average income of participant) 100,
     A is average monthly income of all participants
 Contribution Rates
The basis of contribution would be the standard monthly income of the previous year
which is determined by dividing the total yearly income declared and reported by 12
8excluding any non-taxable income specified in the Income Tax Act. The standard
monthly income is then classified into 45 income-class categories which run from the
bottom category 1 (220,000 won) to the top category 45 (3,600,000 Won), which is
applicable to both workers and the self-employed alike.6
The current contribution rate for the employed sector is set at 9% of the standard
monthly wage of the participant. The contribution rate had grown gradually from 3% to
6%, then to the current level. The growth of the contribution rates for the employed
workers and for the self-employed are shown in <Table 1-4> and <Table 1-5>
respectively.
<Table 1-4> Contribution Rates for Employed Workers by Period
Participant Contributor 1988 92 1993 97 1998 1999 2009
Total 3% 6% 9% 9%
Employed
Workers
Employee
Employer
 Converted from
Retirement
Allowance
1.5%
1.5%
-
2%
2%
2%
3%
3%
3%
4.5%
4.5%
-
<Table 1-5> Contribution Rates for the Self-employed by Period
Year 19951999
1999
2000
2000.
2001
2001
2002
2002
2003
2003
2004
2004
2005
2005
2009
Contribution
Rate 3% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9%
Note: 1. Voluntary self-employed included
 The State of the NPS Fund
The total inflow to the National Pension Fund since its inception in 1988, amounted to
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973.7 trillion Won (as of 31 December 2000): 52.3 trillion from contribution and 12.5
trillion from operational profits. The total outflow from the fund amounted to 13.0
trillion Won: 12.5 trillion for benefit payments and 541.2 billion for administration
costs.
<Table 1-6> Income and Expenditure Record of the NPS Fund (Accumulated)
    (Unit: 100 million)
Year
Category ‘88 ‘92 ‘95 ‘97 ‘98 ‘99 2000
Total 5,282 52,019 181,597 331,906 448,519 583,614 736,620
Contributions 5,069 41,770 141,085 247,278 325,685 419,544 523,133
Returns from
Investment 201 10,185 40,449 84,543 122,749 163,971 213,358
R
evenues
Others 12 64 63 85 85 99 129
Total 3 4,516 22,044 49,082 73,872 113,692 130,468
Benefits 3 3,760 19,836 46,012 70,266 109,173 125,056
Expendit Others 0 756 2,208 3,070 3,606 4,519 5,412
Data: National Pension Corporation, National Pension Statistics Annual Report, Each
Year, Ministry of Health and Welfare
Management and Investment
As of late 2000, 34.5 trillion won (56.9%) was allocated to public sector while 25.4
trillion won (41.9%) and 716.5 billion won (1.2%) was allocated to finance sector and
welfare sector respectively.
<Table 1-7> Investment Portfolio of the NPS Fund: 1988-2000
          (Unit: 100M Won, %)
‘88 ‘92 ‘96 ‘97 ‘98 ‘99 2000
Total 5,279(100)
47,503
(100)
216,709
(100)
282,824
(100)
374,647
(100)
469,922
(100)
606,152
(100)
Public
Sector
2,880
(54.6)
21,278
(44.8)
146,752
(67.7)
190,652
(67.4)
267,951
(71.5)
318,573
(67.8)
345,114
(56.9)
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Welfare
Sector
0
(0.0)
2,400
(5.0)
6,945
(3.2)
8,052
(2.8)
14,385
(3.8)
9,899
(2.1)
7,165
(1.2)
Finance
Sector
2,399
(45.4)
23,825
(50.2)
63,012
(29.1)
84,119
(29.7)
92,310
(24.6)
141,450
(30.1)
253,873
(41.9)
Data: National Pension Corporation, National Pension Statistics Annual Report, Each
Year, Ministry of Health and Welfare
. Pending Issues with the NPS
(1) Long-term financial instability is still lingering even with the reformed system
- If the current contribution rate 9% is kept unchanged, the NPS is projected to
run deficit from 2034 and be depleted by 2048
- Otherwise, the NPS contribution rate should be ultimately raised up to 18-19%
by 2030
- The expected rapid transition to an aged society will be an another threatening
factor to the NPS’ future
<Table 1-8> Timing of Transition to an Aging and to an Aged Society by Selected
Countries
Japan
U
.S
.
U
.K
.
F
ran
ce
G
erm
any(w)
S
w
eden
K
orea
Aging Society
(A)
1970 1945 1930 1865 1930 1890 1999
Aged Society
(B)
1996 2020 1975 1980 1975 1975 2022
Years between
(A) and (B)
26 75 45 115 45 85 22
(2) Inter-Generational Inequity in Contribution and Benefit
- The NPS’ gloomy future in its financial status should turn into an excessive
burden on the future generation, which in turn would negatively affect the
national economy
- The required increase in contribution and reduction in pension benefit, as
11
projected, should be begetting a ‘unfair’ inter-generational transfer of financial
resources
(3) Intra-Generational Inequity due to Imbalance in Contribution between Sectors
- For the NPS containing a re-distributive element in the benefit formula,
transparency in income assessment and report is a must for a fair share of the
cost and benefit among participants
-  The extended coverage of the NPS incorporated more than 10 million new
potential participants from the urban self-employed sector. But only about
1/2(50%) of them are found to be actively participating and contributing to the
NPS. The rest of them are all classified as ‘exempt’ for contribution (due to
unemployment, working but no income, economically inactive, etc.)
-  If the problem of system avoidance, income underreport or no report is not to be
much improved in the near future, this between-sector imbalance problem will
be turned into a ‘unfair’ intra-generational inequity between the
employed(where income exposure and report is almost 100%) and the self-
employed sector7
<Table 1-9> The Proportion of the Urban Self-Employed by Income Report and
Contribution Status
                                              (unit, 1000 persons, %)
Participants (%) Income
Reported
(%) Contribution
Exempt
(%)
4/1999 8,839 100 4,025 45.4 4,813 54.5
12/1999 8,739 100 3,914 44.8 4,825 55.2
12/2000 8,581 100 4,538 54.1 3,843 45.9
12/2001 8,132 100 4,355 53.6 3,777 46.4
(4) A Low Effective Participation Rate and Large Proportion Eventually Out of the
System
- A large proportion of the self-employed, workers at small firms, and women are
not actively participating nor contributing to the NPS
- A considerable proportion of the active participants would fail to satisfy the
minimum contribution period(10 years) given the relatively large number of
workers self-employed and working in the SME sector
- There are large differences in participation rate and contribution level between
adult men and women: a large proportion of the eligible women would end up
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with a very poor pension benefit when they get old
- A rough estimation hints us that no less than 40% of the old-aged Koreans in
year 2008 will be out of the NPS benefit
(5) A Large Gap between the Target and Effective Level of Pension Benefit
- The target income replacement rate of the NPS for the average wage workers is
60% for 40 year’s continuous contribution
- Contribution to the NPS occurs only when the participants are working with
income
- There are numerous negative factors within Korean economy and industry that
work against the participants’ good contribution history and good pension
benefits accrued: (a) relatively late entry into the labor market with full-time
work (at age 27-30 for men who should spend 1-3 years in mandatory service in
army), (b) large number of involuntary early retirement (at age 45-55), and high
turn-over rate and short average tenure especially in the SME sector which takes
up more than 90% of the total employment
- But only a very small proportion of the participants would be lucky enough to
be continuously working with a job for 40 years; most of them would be end up
working less than 30 years
(6) A Large Size of the NPS fund Being Accumulated and Its Management Issue
- The NPS is being operated as a partially funded system. The fund will keep
growing for 20-30 years from now
- It is projected that the NPS reserves would grow as large as 50%-100% - a
figure unprecedented in the international history of the public pension fund –
depending on the rate of contribution increases
- The sheer size of the cumulating fund is threatening, whether it is invested in
SOC or in equity market or public bond
- This would obviously raise important questions about the role of the NPS in the
capital market, corporate governance and potential conflicts of interest for the
Government in its role as institutional investor and the regulator of industry and
financial markets (World Bank, 2000, p.20)
<Figure 1> Projected Accumulation of NPS Reserves, 1999-2080
- the manger of the fund would become a big hand in the financial market and
also a regular (World Bank, 2000).
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Notes:  Bank staff calculations assuming gradual increase in contribution rate to 17.25 by 2033.  Rate of
return on investments of NPS reserves assumed equal to GDP growth. Cited from World Bank (2000)
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3. Special Occupational Pension Schemes
A. History
The Special Occupational Pension (SOP) Scheme refers to the public pension scheme
for three special occupational groups: (a)Government Employees (+ Public School
Teachers), (b)Military Personnel, (c)Private School Teachers. These SOPs are
introduced far ahead of the NPS.
The Government Employees’ Pension was established in January 1960 as the first
public pension scheme in Korea by the Government Employee’s Pension Act. The
number of civil servants covered by the act quadrupled from 237,500 in 1960 to
913,900 in late 1999. The public pension scheme for military personnel was launched at
the same time with the Government Employees' Pension but its administration has been
entrusted to the Ministry of National Defense since 1963. The number of participants
covered by the Military Personnel Pension has increased from 117,000 in 1963 to
154,000 in 1998. The occupational pension scheme for private school teachers was
launched in 1975 and now covers about 207,700 members.
These SOP schemes are all defined benefit schemes that guarantee a maximum 76%
of the final 3-year average salary (for minimum, 20-year, maximum 33-year
contribution). For the government employees, a special retirement allowance that
amounts to variable percentage (10%-60%) of the monthly salary, depending on the
length of service, is accrued for each year of service, payable in lump-sum at the time of
retirement.
The contribution rates for the SOP schemes for Government employees are currently
set at 17%: 8.5% by the employee, 8.5% by the Government. The contribution rate for
the SOP for private school teachers is also 17%: 8.5% by the employee, 5% by the
corporate, 3.5% by the Government.
<Table 1-10> History of the Contribution Rates for Government Employee’s Pension
1960 1970 1996 1999 2001
Employee 2.3% 5.5% 6.5% 7.5% 8.5%
Government 2.3% 5.5% 6.5% 7.5% 8.5%
<Table 1-11> History of the Contribution Rates for the Private School Teacher’s
Pension
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1975-1995 1996-1998 1999-2000 2001-
Employee 5.5% 6.5% 7.5% 8.5%
Corporate 3.5% 4.0% 4.5% 5.0%
Government 2.0% 2.5% 3.0% 3.5%
B. Current Financial Status of the SOPs
The SOP schemes are all suffering from serious under-funding. The Government
employee’s scheme has already turned deficit (contribution income < pension benefit
paid) as of 1998 and is financially depleted in 2001.8 The size of the under-funding is
projected to be rapidly increasing from 6 trillion by 2010 to 31 trillion by 2020 to 91
trillion by 2030. The SOP for the military personnel is worse: the fund was depleted
way ago in 1977 and has been subsidized by the Government budget. The state of the
SOP for the private school teachers is a little better than the other two, but it is also
projected to run deficit in 2012 and be depleted in 2018 if the current scheme continues.
This severe financing problem common to all 3 SOP schemes is simply due to
initially an actuarially poor design and failure to reform the system at the right time
thereafter. It is projected that, to meet the current pension promises, the contribution rate
should be raised eventually up to 30-35% , which would entail an excessive financial
burden to be imposed on the future generation and an increasing government subsidy.
C. Recent Reform Efforts
To improve the financial status of the 3 SOPs, three related Acts - Government
Employees Pension Act, Private School Teachers Pension Act, and Military Personnel
Pension Act, were amended in December 2000 as follows.
- The contribution rate is raised from 15% to 17%;
- The benefit entitlement rule is reinforced from entitlement based minimum (20)
years of contribution to that based on minimum retirement age (currently 50, shall
be raised by 1 year in every other year) plus minimum years of contribution.9
- The pension benefits will be price-indexed instead of wage-indexed.
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9
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changes in the benefit entitlement rule.
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4. The Public-Private Pension Reform Task Force (1999)
In the midst of the financial crisis and in the context of Structural Adjustment
Loans(SALI, II), the World Bank and the Korean government agreed to take a critical
look at the public and private pension system and to draft a white paper on pension
reform. In accordance, the Government established a new Pension Reform Task Force
at the end of 1998. In the White Paper, the Task Force was commissioned to outline an
integrated pension reform strategy, which could serve as the reference for new
legislation. The major issues to be addressed included:
 Appropriate level of pension benefit and required but affordable contribution
rates
 An efficient and viable division of role between public and private pension for
old-age income security
 A reform strategy for existing retirement allowance scheme: especially
conversion to funded pension system
 Integration of the occupational schemes with the NPS
 A reform strategy for the SOP: especially long-term financing
The Task Force prepared and issued a White Paper at the end of 2000. In the White
Paper, issues relating to the public pensions and their long-term financing were
addressed in some depth but without any detailed, practical reform measures. Three
macro-level reform models for the public-private pension scheme were suggested. But
the basic ideas and reform options suggested did not show much improvement beyond
and above those by the NPRB in 2 years ago. The paper also failed to deliver any
detailed reform strategies for the retirement allowance scheme, even though it was
critical for the first and the most important issue (i.e., the division of role between the
public-private pension for old-age income security) to be addressed in due manner.
The major points and recommendations for reform made by the Task Force can be
summarized as follows:
First, the Task force considered what would be the appropriate contribution rate for
the National Pension Scheme that ensures its long term financial sustainability and that
is affordable, at the same time, for participants. The majority of members considered
that 15% would be the maximum contribution rate, although the minority view was that
the contribution rate should be capped at 10% and any further financial burden should
be borne by the Government.
Second, the Task Force deliberated the division of role to be played by public and
private pension schemes for old age income security. Majority view was that private
pensions should weigh in and play a larger role to make the public pension less loaded
and more sustainable, while the minority view maintained that the current system with
the public pension playing a leading role desirable. But the Task force was unanimous
in viewing that the target benefit level of the NPS should be adjusted downward and the
resulting gap in old-age income should be met by private pensions such as corporate
17
pension scheme.
Third, the task force unanimously recommended that the existing retirement
allowance system should be converted to corporate pension to constitute a multi-pillar
system with the NPS and personal pension.
Fourth, the issue of portability between public pensions(the NPS and Special
Occupational Pensions) was seriously considered by the Task Force, whose majority
view was that unconstrained portability between public pensions should be definitely
arranged in an appropriate way. One solution recommended was to incorporate part of
the occupational pensions into the NPS and to convert the remaining part into a system
like corporate pension.
The reform models proposed by the Task Force can be described as follows:
(1) Reform Option A: Partial Parametric Reform
  The basic idea of the reform option A is to keep the original framework of the current
system and instead to undertake parametric reforms to improve the public pension’s
financial status. Under this option, the level of pension benefit will be adjusted
downward and the contribution rate will be adjusted upward.
<Table 1-12> Public-Private Pension Model (Reform Option A)
Personal Pension Personal Pension
Supplementary CP
( 15%)
Supplementary
SOP (20%)
Supplementary
SOP (20%)
Corporate
Pension(20%)
Personal Pension
National Pension Scheme (60%)
Government
Employees'
Pension (80%)
Private School
Teachers Pension
(80%)
Employees Self-employed Participants in the SOP
Reform Measures for National Pension Scheme
The income distribution functions will be maintained;
The pensionable age will be automatically adjusted to life expectancy increases
Contribution credit will be granted to the unemployed, poor, students, and soldiers
to facilitate their pension rights
 he upward adjustment of contribution rate on gradual basis to 15.24% (then
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financial deficit will not occur until 2080 and the size of reserve fund will be 6.4
times of the expected expenditures).
Reform Measures for Special Occupational Pensions
The SOPs will continue as separate pension schemes, independent from the NPS
The pension benefit should be based on the average lifetime income instead of the
final salary
The current contribution rate of 17% should be gradually increased to 20% by
2005, of which 8% should be paid by the participant and the rest by the Government
(2) Reform Option B: NPS as a basic pension and the CP/new SOP as the second pillar
The basic idea of the reform option B is to reform and integrate part of the SOP into
the reduced NPS as a base pension for all pension groups. The remaining part of the
SOP will be reformed into a new SOP similar to the corporate pension which is
proposed to take place of the RAS.
<Table 1-13> Public-Private Pension Model (Reform Option B)
Personal Pensions Personal Pension
Supplementary CP
Personal Pension
Supplementary SOP
Mandatory Corporate
Pension (20 –25%)
Individual Retirement
Account (IRA) Pension New SOP (20 –25%)
National Pension Scheme (single 45%, Couple 50%)
Employees Self-employed Participants in SOP
Note: Replacement rates for 40 years service in bracket.
Reform Measure for National Pension Scheme
The current replacement rate of 60% of NPS will be adjusted downward to 45%
for single and 50% for couple by gradually reducing the rate between 2006 and
2030
The total replaced rate by the NPS and the to-be mandatory corporate pension
combined will be about 70%
The contribution credit will be granted to those unemployed, low income earners,
and those in military service, men in maternal leave for child birth and care
 The contribution rate should be gradually raised from 9% to 15.24% between
2010-2030 to secure a long-term financial stability
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Reform Measures for the Special Occupational Pensions
The SOP scheme should be split into two parts; one part to be converted to the
NPS (first pillar) and the remaining part to be reformed into a new SOP (second
pillar)
The new SOP shall be operated as a notional defined contribution (NDC) scheme
 The Government will be solely responsible to contribute 6% to the new SOP and
its replacement rate will be at the similar level with the corporate pension scheme
(3) Reform Option C: Conversion to a Two-Tiered NPS
The basic idea of the reform option C is to split the NPS into two tiers: a Basic
Pension and an Earnings-related Pension, which will be financed separately. The first
tier basic pension shall be a universal, minimum pension covering literally all
population groups, thereby achieving “one pension for one person”. The second-tier
earnings-related pension shall be a fully-funded, DB scheme and the pension benefit
will be 100% contribution-based. The SOP scheme should also be reformed so that the
participants of the SOP scheme could join the first tier basic pension and that new SOP
scheme could be set-up as a reduced earnings-related DB scheme. Corporate pension
will be introduced but remain as a voluntary system for a while, which means that
conversion of the RAS into corporate pension should be left to the discretion of the
company concerned.
<Table 1-14> Public-Private Pension Model (Option C)
Personal Pension Personal Pension
Earnings related
NPS ( 20%)
Personal Pension
Special Occupational Pensions
Basic NPS (Single 20%, Couple 40%)
Employees Self-employed Participants in the SOP
Reform of National Pension System
The basic NPS will be operated as a tax-based PAYG scheme with the target
replacement rate set at 20% of the average income of all participants
	
 will be operated as a fully funded DB scheme with
the target replacement rate set at of 20% of the participant’s average lifetime income
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The contribution rate for the basic pension should be around 1.9% in 2001, 2.7%
in 2020, 8.4% in 2040 and 10.5% in 2080
The contribution rate for the earnings-related pension will be around 6%
Reform of Public Occupational Pension
The SOP schemes will be split into two: a basic NPS and a new SOP
 Contribution rate will be adjusted upward to 21%
Pension benefit will be paid as a defined benefit based on the average life-time
income indexed to price
 Another reform option (D), which intends to consolidate the 3 options into one, was
proposed, but is not presented here because its basic structure is not much different from
the option B.
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II. Korean Retirement Allowance Scheme: Its Past and Future Tasks
1. The Retirement Allowance Scheme
Retirement allowance scheme(RAS) is one of the oldest income security measures in
Korea. It is based on the Labor Standard law, which mandates employers to specify
retirement allowance plan either in employment contract or in collective agreement and
to pay retirement allowance which amounts to minimum one-month salary(wage) per 1
year tenure (about 8.3% of the payroll) when the worker leaves or is laid off from the
firm. Being stipulated as one of the articles that pertain to labor standards, the RAS has
been regulated and supervised very loosely for a long period of time and largely
unfunded as the majority of the plans are on book reserve state. No formal government
intervention occurred until public concerns for the high risk of default imbedded in the
largely unfunded scheme was heightened with the advent of the economic crisis and
large scale bankruptcies as a consequence.
As such, the first and foremost reform measure to be taken for the RAS should be
converting the scheme into an externally funded system, which should be further
developed into corporate pensions.
2. Task of Converting Retirement Allowances into Corporate Pensions
The World Banks’ White Paper on Korean pension reform(World bank, 2000)
recommended a gradual transition to a funded scheme by amortizing past accrued
liabilities of the firms concerned following the U.S. case in the mid-1970s after the
ERISA passed. Obviously, the transition process should be coordinated with setting up
regulation rules. Especially, when the corporate pension is designed to be a DB scheme,
then, the above mentioned amortization arrangements should be specified in line with
the funding rules to be set-up. The World Bank also recommended that, in addition to
defined benefit(DB) regulations, step two of the reform should be setting the rules for a
defined contribution(DC) scheme in a way that fulfills the existing mandate of the RAS.
During 2000-2001, in the midst of heightened public interest and attention on
corporate pension as a more ‘desirable and efficient’ alternative to the RAS for workers’
old-age income security, the KLI launched a long-term research project and formed a
expert’s forum, funded by the Ministry of Labor, to take a critical look at the current
state of the RAS and to come up with policy recommendations for the RAS reform to be
implemented.
In the first year, the research project was focused on appropriate ways and procedures
for transition to corporate pension scheme that minimizes the transition costs. Main
concerns and considerations were on how to protect the vested interests of workers in
the existing system, what would be the type of corporate pension that would be
acceptable to employers while fulfilling the Labor Standard’s mandates, what would be
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the right form of corporate pension what would run smooth in the financial and
institutional context of the Korean economy and industrial relations.
In the second year, the research project was focused on specifying, in more detail, the
type and content of the corporate pension that could meet the concerns and
considerations laid out in the first year’s project and that could be successfully
implemented after 2-3 years’ preparation. The second year’s report also included a
chapter that drafts tentative corporate pension law to be legislated.
3. Reform Options for the Korean Retirement Allowance System
The results of the 1st year’s research project can be summarized in 3 alternative
procedures and models for transition from the RAS to corporate pension. Here below, I
describe those 3 transition models.
The first option is a (1)System Conversion Model through which voluntary corporate
pension plans are introduced as a supplement to the current retirement allowance
system, and mandating it by law afterwards. The second is an (2)Inter-generational
Transition Model under which current system is maintained for currently employed
workers, while introducing a corporate pension system for new entrants. The third is a
more fundamental and long-term reform model that seeks to build a (3)Multi-Pillar
System for old-age income security by linking the earnings-related part of the NPS to
the corporate pension to be instituted.10 In order for any of the transition models to be
effectively implemented, conversion of the unfunded RAS to a funded scheme is a
prerequisite.
(1) Transition Model I : System Transition Model: Retirement Allowance Scheme 
voluntary corporate pension plan  mandatory corporate pension plans
Background
Model 1 takes particular account of: the symbolic value and rigidity of the current
retirement allowance system in the context of Korea’s labor and management relations;
and market factors, namely, the lack of stability and development in the financial
market. Employees have long perceived retirement allowances as deferred payment of
their wages paid in a lump sum at retirement and therefore do not welcome the change.
The lack of experience and information on the part of both employee and employer,
coupled with instabilities in the financial market, will have a negative effect on the
                                                
10
 The three transition models, while mutually exclusive, can be pursued simultaneously.
For instance, the first model serves as a basis for the introduction of the following two, and
the third model can be implemented in conjunction with the other models. However, I will
explicate each of the models on the assumption that each will be pursued separately and
independently of one another.
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introduction of corporate pension plans. Employee apprehension will also have to be
taken into account.
  (B) Transition Procedure
Considering the above circumstances, one possible way of reforming the system
would be to (a)introduce the voluntary corporate pension system while preserving the
current retirement allowance system, (b)gradually phase out the retirement allowance
system, and (c)replace the voluntary corporate pension with legally mandated corporate
pension plans in the future. A voluntary corporate pension system here means a pension
plan whose establishment and participation are not mandated by law, and thus
voluntary. The phase-out period of the retirement allowance system should be set in the
long term of five years or more, and the deadline for a complete transition (ex: ten
years) may be imposed by law.
Table 2-1  System Transition Model : RAS  Corporate Pension
Retirement
allowance system
Retirement
allowance systemRetirement
allowance system Voluntary
corporate pension
Qualified corporate
pension
 Corporate Pension
In order to switch to the corporate pension system via the system transition model, a
qualified pension plan is recommended as a stepping stone (see the US and Japanese
experience for reference). In other words, discriminatory tax treatments are applied to
voluntary corporate pension plans, and only qualified ones would receive tax benefits.
This would facilitate the transition to a mandatory pension plan, so that ultimately it
could replace the retirement allowance system.
The plan could be either a defined benefit or a defined contribution plan. On the
condition that the plan guarantees about the same level of benefit by the current
retirement allowance scheme, the new plan should be recognized as one that can
substitute the retirement allowance system. This way, employees will have a broader
choice of plan options (e.g. ESOPs, stock options).
 (C) Advantages and disadvantages of the Transition Model I
The advantages of model 1 are that it makes for a smooth transition and minimizes
transition cost. The advantages are as follows:
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- Serves as a tentative transition model: Minimizes the risk of policy failure. In other
words, by initially introducing the plan as voluntary and not mandatory, the economy is
given the opportunity to test its value and feasibility within the context of actual
business environment.
- Serves as a bridge to a new system: The voluntary corporate pension plan serves as an
intermediary, or a “bridge,” leading to the legally-defined  corporate pension system.
- Serves as an educational and training tool: Through the voluntary corporate pension
plan, we may expect an educational and training effect for both management and labor.
The experience of companies adopting the plan will serve as an example for companies
that have not yet done so. A successful example may work as a strong incentive for
others.
- Its effect on the financial market would be the same as when it is mandatory if the
voluntary plan becomes widely accepted.
However, the potential disadvantage is that while most large companies are likely to
implement the voluntary pension plan, SMEs would choose not to, resulting in pension
disparity among workers.
(2) Transition Model II : Introduction of Mandatory Corporate Pension through Inter-
generational Transition Model
 (A) Transition Model II-A
Transition Model II-A aims to replace current retirement allowance system with
corporate pension scheme at one point in time, which will be compulsorily applied to
new members of the labor market. But for the existing workers, the same RAS will be
applied, even though they would be allowed to switch to the new system.
Table 2-2 Inter-generational Transition Model II-A
Retirement Allowance system
(Current Working Generation)
Mandatory Corporate Pension Plans
(New Working Generation)
(B) Transition Model II-B
Unlike the drastic transition Model II-A, Model II-B suggests a long-term gradual
transition from the RAS to corporate pension through contribution conversion. Under
the plan, a gradually increasing portion of the legally required retirement allowances
will be transferred into corporate pension. Korea can refer to the case of Australia
(Superannuation introduced in 1991). At the first stage, even though the marginal
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operational cost of private pension system should be taken into account in setting the
initial conversion rate, it can start with 2-3.0%, and then be periodically raised (ex: 1st
stage: 2.0-3.0% =>2nd stage: 4.0% => 3rd stage: 6.0% => 4th stage: 8.0%)
<Table 2-3  Gradual Transition Model II-B through Contribution Conversion
Retirement
AllowanceRetirement
AllowanceRetirement
Allowance
Contribution to
Corporate Pension
(DB, DC)
Contribution to
Corporate Pension
(DB, DC)
Contribution to
Corporate Pension
(DB, DC)
Corporate Pension
(DB,DC)
2.0% (by 2003) 4.0% (by 2005) 6.0% (by 2007) 8.0% (by 2009)
(C) Advantages and Disadvantages of Transition Model II
The strength of Transition Model II-A is that it can minimize social costs during
transition by keeping the vested rights of existing working generation intact while
introducing new alternative system that is reasonable in the long run. The weakness of
this model, on the other hand, is that it requires long transition period because it takes a
generation to complete the reform.
Since Transition Model II-B is designed to introduce corporate pension system by
gradually phasing out existing retirement allowance system, transition cost seems not
too high, therefore opposition from vested interest groups is not likely to be strong. In
particular, this model is advantageous to both companies and employees. Considering
the fact that current retirement allowance is mostly unfunded, this is better for
employees in that pension benefits will be fully guaranteed under the plan. This model
will also allow companies to gradually repay retirement allowance liability without
additional contributions. In addition, Transition model II-B requires a far shorter
transition period compared to Transition Model II-A.
(3) Transition Model III : Transition Model through Contract-Out of Public Pension
This model aims to reduce the burden of the NPS on a gradual basis while increasing
the role of corporate pension, which is a worldwide trend in pension reform. This model
is also in line with the structural reform plan proposed in the World Bank’s white paper
on Korean Pension Reform. Two specific transition options could be devised under this
plan.
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(A) Transition Model III-A
Under this model, the contribution rate for employer and employee will be reduced to
2.25% respectively (total 4.5%) by contracting out the earnings related component of
National Pension, whereas the benefit level will be cut down to half the current level. In
this case, employees will transfer the remaining 2.25% to corporate pension plans and
employers will be obligated to pay around 8.0% as contribution to the fully funded
pension plan.
• In case target income replacement rate is set at 60% of final income:
- Contribution rate to National Pension: employer =2.25%, employee = 2.25%,
- Contribution rate to Corporate Pension: employer = 8%, employee = 2.25%
(B) Transition Model III-B
Under this model, contribution rates for both employer and employee to National
Pension is limited to current 4.5% level respectively and additional increase will be
gradually transferred into corporate pension funds in accordance with planned schedule.
As a result, additional increase along with existing contribution from employer will be
reserved in the corporate pension.
• If target income replacement rate is set at 60% of final income
- Contribution rate to National Pension: employer = 4.5%; employee = 4.5%
- Contribution to Corporate Pension: employer = 8% + (= additional premium hike)
However, both Model A and B can additionally review a plan to allow interim
adjustment of retirement allowance or some part of corporate pension. Employers under
model B have to bear more contribution burden compared with Model A, However,
additional contribution will serve to strengthen the redistributive component of the
National Pension.
Table 2-4  Transition Model Linking Public Pension to Private Pension
Private Pension
Private Pension
Partial Advance Withdrawal
(allowed?)
Legally-set Retirement Allowance Corporate Pension
(from Retirement Allowance)
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Earnings –related Component Corporate Pension
(Contracted Out)Nati-
onal
Pens
-ion
Basic Protection
(redistributive) Component
Basic Pension
(C) Strengths and Weaknesses of the Transition Model III
This model is a strong reform model in that it can secure sustainability of public
pension while introducing new corporate pension system at the same time without
incurring much additional cost on companies. The weakness is that contracting-out of
public pension is plausible only when corporate pension system is already set-up and
run smooth. In addition, if the inter-generational model is applied, transition period will
be too long.
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III. An Alternative Reform Model for the Korean Pension System
1. A Critical Review of the Reform Models Recommended in the Past
The basic ideas and reform models suggested by the NPRB(1998) and the Task
Force(1999) can be summarized and reviewed as follows:
A. Issues Derived from the System Itself: Long-term Sustainability and
Intergenerational Inequity
The most common and serious issue raised with the current NPS relates to its long-term
financial sustainability. And to deal with this issue, reform measures recommended
were either parametric or systemic: the former recommending a parametric adjustment
of the NPS scheme and the latter, a systemic reform of the whole scheme.
(1) Parametric Reform Measures
Advocates of the parametric reform suggested that, while keeping the structure of the
current system intact, parameters(contribution and benefit levels) of the system needs to
be adjusted to improve long-term financial sustainability. That is, they recommended
that (a)contribution rates should be gradually raised upward (up to 18%), and (b)the
target benefit level should be adjusted downward and/or (c)retirement age should be
gradually raised up to 65 in the long-term. These reform measures, though in a much
softer version than recommended, were incorporated into the amended National Pension
Act in 1999.
These parametric reform measures, however, are criticized as a partial/incomplete
reform leaving more fundamental issues not addressed. That is, even though the
parametric reform measures might improve the system’s financial sustainability to some
extent, that could happen only at the sacrifice of the next generation, i.e., a ‘unfair’
transfer of excess financial burden from the current to the future generation (Issue of
Inter-generational Inequity). The parametric reform measures also leaves the problem of
system avoidance and income underreport, which is much prevalent and serious among
the self-employed and in small-sized workplaces, unsolved – another reason why those
measures are criticized as incomplete. Intra-generational inequity in contribution and
benefit would occur when the benefit formula has a redistributive element as in the
current NPS.
(2) Systemic Reform Measures
The systemic reform model suggests that the current NPS should be separated into two
independent parts: a basic pension and an earnings-related pension, which means a
systemic change in the financing method. This systemic reform follows closely with the
basic direction of the reform recommended by the NPRB(1998) and also with what the
OECD(2000) suggested. The OECD suggested that the current NPS be split into a basic
pension financed by tax and an earnings-related pension of fully funded DB-type. For a
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multi-pillar system to be instituted, the OECD suggests that the current RAS should be
converted into a corporate pension scheme based on defined contribution.
<Table 3-1> The Multi-Pillar Pension Model by the OECD(2000)
3rd Pillar Personal Pension Voluntary
Privately Managed
2nd Pillar Corporate Pension Mandatory
Converted from the RAS
Based on Firms
2nd-Tier Earnings-related Pension State-run Mandatory
Fully Funded DB
Target R.R.=20%
1st Pillar
1st-Tier Basic Pension State-run Mandatory
Tax-based
Target R.R.=20%
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B. Issues Derived from the Application of the NPS in Korean context
Issues derived from the application of the system relates to the problems arising from
the relatively large self-employed sector, where small shops and workplaces with only a
small number of workers are heavily populated, and the characteristic low participation
and high exemption rates among those pertaining to the sector. In a system where
uniform benefit formula applies to both workers in the self-employed and those in the
employed sector, high rate of hide and avoidance, systematic underreport of income,
and thus low contribution among the former11 would eventually result in an intra-
generational inequity in the NPS. This imbalance between the self-employed and the
employed sector in participation and contribution could be aggravated when
contribution rate is raised in the future.
To sum, the NPS is afflicted with both inter-generational and intra-generational inequity
in contribution and benefit. The inter-generational inequity comes mainly from the
actuarially insensible structure (design) of the system: low contribution and high
benefit,12 which would get worse with the rapid aging of the Korean population in 20-30
years. The intra-generational inequity comes mainly from the context of the system
application: the observed high rates of system avoidance, low rate of effective
participation, and income underreport when participating reluctantly, etc. among the
self-employed sector.
The actuarially insensible design of the NPS is well witnessed when the system was
first reformed in 1998, less than 10 years since first implemented, when the promised
benefit was considerably (more than 10%) cut down and the contribution rate was
projected to be rapidly raised over time. This implies that built in the NPS is a pension
promise that could not be kept as scribed without incurring an excessive financial
burden on future generation (‘a promise not to be kept’).
The peculiarity of the Korean NPS is that there is only a limited link between the
contribution (financing) stage and the (benefit) distribution stage: that is, pension
benefit is split into two components (redistributive + earnings-related) while
contribution is unified (‘an inefficient financing method’). It is well observed in the past
10 years of the NPS history that the financing method of the system is not an efficient
one given the Korean context: that is, an industrial structure with a relatively large self-
employed sector, and a less developed infrastructure for enforcement and collection,
that is, low rate of income declaration and high rate of income underreport. In such a
context, the cost of system management should also run excessively high.
These observations in sum hint us what would be the right direction of the pension
reform. That is, the public pension promise should be rewritten so that the excessive
                                                
11
 Now more than two years has passed since the NPS coverage was extended to the
urban self-employed sector. But only about 50% of the self-employed are actively
participating (i.e., contributing) in the NPS.
12
 With regard to this issue, it should be reminded that the Korean NPS is run not as a
pay-as-you-go but a (partially) funded system.
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inter-generational inequity be corrected and that the long-term sustainability be secured
to avoid the ‘well-trodden road’ (World Bank, 2000) of our forerunners. At the same
time, the financing method of the NPS should be redesigned so that the system could be
more efficiently managed and the intra-generational inequity be improved.
In this viewpoint the past reform models suggested so far should be regarded as only
partial and incomplete. The parametric reform models are both incomplete in that their
reform recipes depend on the transfer of pension burden to the future generation and
that such reform measures as taken in 1999 (reduction of the pension benefit and raise
of contribution rate) could be repeated in the future.
That is, in coming future, the State, as the manager of the NPS, should be keep juggling
between [raise of contribution rate] and [reduction of benefit level] for the NPS’
financial stability. And it is very likely that the latter option will be taken more often out
of the political motive and interest at the time point. In that case, the initial pension
promise scribed in the NPS would eventually be nullified (‘unkept promise’). Then, the
right direction of the pension reform should be a ‘rewriting of the pension promise and
redesigning of the pension structure’ at this stage when the full benefit is yet to start in
2008.
The systemic reform models are also limited in that practical procedures for the
transition from the current to the reformed system are not specified. Say, how to move
from the current one-tier system to the two-tier (basic pension + earnings-related
pension) system? How to allocate the cumulated fund into each tier when moving to the
two-tier system?, etc. With these questions unanswered, the feasibility of the reform
models should be low.
One notable limitation common to the reform models is that they leave the financing
source and method of the current system untouched while they intend to improve the
financial status of the NPS. But, as the OECD points out, change to the financing
method is a key to an effective reform of the Korean pension system for a better
financial sustainability and a more efficient system management. Another issue that
should be properly addressed in the systemic reform models relates to transitional
accounting, i.e., the allocation of the cumulated fund into the proposed two tiers, which
would be subject to the conflicts of vested interests.
2. Summary Evaluation of the Korean Pension System
 (1) Even after the first reform measures, the NPS will continue to be suffering from
long-term financial sustainability. Otherwise, contribution rates would have to be
continuously raised up and/or promised pension benefits to be cut down.
 (2) The NPS is far limited in the aspect of ‘effective’ universal coverage, a critical
element for a ‘national’ pension, and less likely to provide a minimum protection of old-
age income (Lack of Universality).
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- The economically low class, whose employment history is irregular and low
paid, are much more likely to be out of the system or to retire with a very poor
pension benefit accrued, even though they are the ones that most need social
protection
(3) The NPS (benefit) system is designed to be ‘inter-generationally unfair’, that is, too
generous to the current generation and too expensive to the future generation, which
constitutes a structural factor that weakens its long-term financial sustainability (Low
Financial Sustainability and Inter-generational Inequity).
(4) The NPS is inefficiently managed and ‘intra-generationally unfair’. That is, there are
wide discrepancies between employment sectors in terms of effective participation,
contribution level, and expected pension benefit (Intra-generational Inequity)
- Workers in the self-employed sector or SME are less likely to contribute and
more likely to retire with only a limited pension benefit accrued
- The well-observed, considerably low rate of income transparency/declaration
among the self-employed would result in ‘intra-generational’ inequity in
pension contribution and benefit to the disadvantage of the employed workers
- These ‘intra-generational inequity’ tend to be aggravated by the inadequate
financing and distribution method embedded in the NPS with one-channeled
financing for two channeled distribution into (a)redistributive benefit and
(b)earnings-related benefit (Inadequate and Inefficient Financing Method in
Korean Context)
(5) Being operated as a (partially) funded system, the NPS reserve fund would grow
into an ‘internationally unprecedented’ size for the next 20-30 years and would soon
become a dominating single entity in the capital market, and/or corporate governance,
too big to be efficiently managed by the Government’s agency (National Pension
Corporation)
(6) Korean public pension system is very loosely structured one with limited
transportability between the relevant schemes (Lack of Portability between Public
Schemes)
- This limiting factor is particularly problematic when labor mobility between
(public-private) sectors is increasing in 21st century
- Links between public schemes should be properly arranged
(7) The mandatory Retirement Allowance Scheme financed by the employer remains
one of the most inefficient and unproductive element as an private old-age income
provision
- The RAS is largely unfunded and needs to and could be productively converted
into a modern corporate pension for a multi-pillar pension system needed to be
established for a rapidly aging society
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3. Alternative Reform Model for Korean Pension System
(1) Basic Directions for Reform
In accordance to the critical review of the Korean pension system and derived reform
needs, following issues and concerns should be properly addressed and be taken care of
in the alternative reform model.
 The improvement of the NPS’ long-term sustainability, while at the same time,
lessening inter-generational inequity in pension cost and benefit
 Better performance of the NPS as a social security program (Minimum Old-age
Income Guarantee, Universal Coverage) – a 1st-tier Basic Pension needed
 Better performance of the NPS as a savings vehicle for an adequate old-income
security (Adequate Old-age Income Secured) – a 2nd-tier Earnings-related Pension
needed
 Reform of the financing method of the NPS for a more efficient and equitable
system application and management
 Improvement in the active participation and effective coverage of the NPS
 Arrangement of proper portability mechanism between public pension schemes
 More close link between contribution (financing) and benefit (distribution) to be
incorporated into the NPS
 Protection of the vested rights and avoidance of the conflicts of interests when
reforming the NPS
 As an outcome, establishment of a better NPS, more efficient and more
sustainable
While in the past reform models, these issues and concerns were addressed only
selectively or not addressed at all, in the alternative reform model all of these issues and
concerns should be properly addressed and taken care of.
(2) Systemic Reform Measures and Procedures
 The current NPS shall be split into a Basic Pension and an Earnings-Related Pension
(i.e., two-tier system)
 Basic Pension:
- a universal minimum old-age income guarantee, financed by tax, could be
means-tested, should be started immediately after reform (1 pension per person)
- target benefit level = about 20% of the average wage/income
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 Earnings-Related Pension:
- a fully-funded Defined Benefit scheme, financed by participants’ contributions
(required contribution rate at around 6%), benefits strictly based on contribution
history (1 pension per 1 active participants)
- target replacement rate = about 20% of the participant’s average wage/income
- Government employees, private school teachers should also participate in the
basic pension.
- See <Table S-1>, <Table S-2>, <Table S-3> for supporting data
 The Special Occupational Pension (SOP) should also be split into a basic NPS and a
new SOP, reduced earnings-related pension
- Part of the SOP contribution will be converted to the basic NPS
- The contribution rate for the new SOP should be appropriately reduced by 2-3% (to be
determined) from the current 17% to 14-15% for a reduced target replacement rate, that
is, 55%, which is equivalent to the current replacement rate (75%), minus the
replacement rate of the basic NPS (20%)13
 The current RAS shall be converted into a corporate pension
- the corporate pension shall be a fully-funded Defined Contribution scheme,
managed in the private sector
- transition to corporate pension could be through either Model I (voluntary) or
Model II (mandatory), which could be determined in the Tripartite
(Government-Management-Labor) commission
- the contribution rate that could effectively meet the RAS mandate should be
negotiated and determined in an actuarially fair way
- would be equivalent to about 20% replacement rate of the average wage
 For the self-employed, IRA(Individual Retirement Account) with appropriate tax
treatment shall be introduced (for supplementary earnings-related pension) as a
voluntary system
 The NPS reserve fund, cumulated contributions of each participants, shall be
converted to the reserve fund for the earnings-related NPS
                                                
13
 The SOP for the Government employees and for the private school teachers are, even
without reform, destined to be subsidized from the General budget due to their ever-
aggravating deficit problem.
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- for the continuing participants, the earning-related NPS benefit shall be
determined both by the old formula (for the old contribution period) and by the
new formula (for the new contribution period)
- the implicit pension debt incurred by the old system shall be taken care of by the
Government (or by the existing participants’ contribution (<0.5%) during
transition period
 Supplemented by the corporate pension (T.T.R.=20%), the total target replacement
rate shall be set at around 70% (In the case of the SOP, 20% by the basic pension plus
55% by its own earnings-related pension will add up to 75%)
 These reform measures shall become effective immediately
 The Reformed Pension System: Two-Tier NPS plus Corporate Pension System
3rd Pillar Personal Pension: Voluntary
2nd Pillar Corporate Pension
(Fully-funded DC):
T.R.R.=20%
IRA (Voluntary)
T.R.R.=20%
2nd-Tier
NPS
Earnings-Related Pension (Fully-funded
DB); T.R.R.=20%
Special
Occupational
Pension: Earnings-
Related, DB;
T.R.R.= 55%
1st
Pillar
1st-Tier
NPS
Basic Pension (Means-Tested)
Tax-based; T.R.R.=20%
Population Group Employed Workers Self-Employed
(including farmers)
Government
Employees/
Teachers
 Advantages and Limits of the Alternative Reform Model
1. Advantages
- The alternative model is better in many aspects: coverage and basic protection,
adequacy, equity, sustainability, public acceptability
The 1st-tier basic pension will be applied universally to all population groups,
guaranteeing a minimum old-age income (coverage and basic protection)
 The 2nd-tier earnings related pension will be based on the individual
contribution records and fully funded DB or NDC, supplementing the basic
pension to secure a adequate level of old-age income (adequacy)
 The two-tiered reformed NPS is better than the current system in term of inter-
and intra-generational equity and system efficiency
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- The reformed system will be much more sustainable with the small-sized basic
pension and the fully-funded earnings-related 2nd-tier pension (the total
contribution rate could be managed within 9-12%)
- The alternative reform model is much more feasible than the past reform models.
 With the past reform models, it would normally take 20-30 years for the
reform measures to be effectively implemented. And in the long-term process,
politics, industrial relations, vested interests, etc all could be a potential
stumbling bloc that could turn, unexpectedly, the original reform agenda upside
down. On the other hand, the alternative model could avoid the potential
problem of unpredictability in the long-term reform process by replacing the old
scheme with the new scheme at one point in time (feasibility).
- The alternative reform model would be much more acceptable to the existing
participants than the old ones because their vested rights are fully protected, and
also to the future participants because their financial burdens would be much
lessened (acceptability)
- The alternative reform model is closely in line with those suggested by the
international organizations (i.e., OECD, ILO, and World Bank) and, above all, is
very similar, in its core idea, to the best model that the NPRB (1998) had
recommended to the Government
- With the alternative reform model, the most critical issues raised against the
current NPS by those international organizations and experts (such as financial
sustainability (World Bank), inefficient financing method (OECD), basic
protection with universal coverage (ILO) could be resolved to a considerable
extent
- With the alternative mode, we could also avoid the problem of a rapidly
cumulating public pension fund, assuming that the basic pension is financed by
tax and that the earnings-related pension is fully-funded and managed in the
private sector
2. Limits
- The basic pension could be exerting extra financial stress on Government
budget (but, the Government could save budget on the National Basic
Livelihood Guarantee for the old people when it is integrated into the Basic
NPS)
- The pension benefit status of the self-employed and low-income, irregular
workers in SME would not be much improved (minimum income could be
protected, but still short of adequate level of old-age income)
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- The task of transparent income assessment and contribution to the earnings-
related NPS for the self-employed still remains, even though much lessened
with the reformed model. But at least intra-generational inequity problem would
be much improved
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[Supplementary Tables]
<Table S-1> Estimate of the Appropriate Contribution Rate for the Earnings-related NPS
<Table S-2>  Financial Projection of the Earnings-related NPS for 2005-2077
(Unit: 100 Million won,1000 Person,%, Times)
<Table S-3>  Financial Projection of the Basic Pension for 2005-2080
Wage
Growth Interest CPI
Contribution
Rate
Benefit
Rate
Return
Rate
1 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.06 0.20 1.34421
2 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.20 1.01307
Year
Fund
Cumulate
d
Total
Income
Total
Expendit
ure
Reserve Members
Beneficia
ries
Maturatio
n
Surplus
Rate
Contribut
ion Rate
2005 1,162,10 204,122 37,641 166,481 17,470 1,123 6.4% 30.9 6.00%
2010 1,987,36 304,038 65,026 239,011 18,199 1,892 10.4% 30.6 6.00%
2015 2,955,26 379,798 99,552 280,246 18,141 2,594 14.3% 29.7 6.00%
2020 4,038,04 478,521 152,330 326,191 17,674 3,942 22.3% 26.5 6.00%
2030 5,788,96 600,502 299,118 301,384 16,318 6,754 41.4% 19.4 6.00%
2040 6,848,30 686,984 441,640 245,343 14,891 8,387 56.3% 15.5 6.00%
2050 7,313,79 780,717 575,050 205,668 14,092 8,545 60.6% 12.7 6.00%
2057 7,411,61 835,646 652,901 182,745 13,409 8,210 61.2% 11.4 6.00%
2060 7,379,11 857,103 694,618 162,485 13,094 8,098 61.8% 10.6 6.00%
2070 6,742,92 916,112 850,800 65,312 12,189 7,648 62.7% 7.9 6.00%
2077 5,811,67 947,204 957,621 -10,417 11,720 7,265 62.0% 6.1 6.00%
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(Unit: 100 Million won,1000 Person,%, Time)
Beneficiaries (A) Total Benefit paid (B)
Year
Membe
rs total Old-age Survivor Total Old-age Survivor
Buffer
Fund B/GDP
2005 32,570 4,862 4,253 609 61,910 46,226 15,684 3,095 0.9
2010 33,381 6,164 5,032 1,132 83,219 51,559 31,660 4,161 1.1
2015 34,221 7,414 5,846 1,568 116,325 69,007 47,318 5,816 1.3
2020 34,479 8,793 6,899 1,894 176,946 115,781 61,166 8,847 1.7
2030 32,385 12,140 10,165 1,976 436,245 363,718 72,527 21,812 3.1
2040 29,519 13,861 12,107 1,754 851,966 777,127 74,839 42,598 4.5
2050 27,483 13,486 11,927 1,559 1,256,214 1,170,370 85,844 53,778 5.0
2060 26,061 12,259 10,762 1,498 1,515,027 1,409,218 105,809 75,751 5.0
2070 24,069 11,637 10,309 1,328 1,845,006 1,724,542 120,464 92,250 5.2
2080 22,570 10,814 9,597 1,218 2,177,541 2,036,546 140,994 108,877 5.3
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